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research article 
So, What About SOX? Market Response to Government Regulation 
—Cindy J. Burrows (Edited by Jennifer Lee) 
On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation, with a record $67 billion in assets, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection, unveiling corporate malfeasance fraught with fraud, secret accounts, insider trading, and third 
party collusion. Nine investment banks conspired with Enron to set up secret accounts, to use off-shore banks 
to disguise loans as sales or investments, and to underwrite sales of Enron stock while approving incomplete 
or incorrect financial statements. Enron’s corporate counsel helped structure interdependent transactions and 
prepare false submissions to the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Twenty–eight Enron 
directors and officers engaged in $1.2 billion of insider trading (Davies 2002). Finally, Arthur Andersen, LLP, 
Enron’s auditing firm, signed off on Enron’s fraudulent financial statements. 
Enron’s implosion wiped out approximately $40 billion in market capitalization as share prices plummeted, but 
it was only the beginning. It soon became apparent that corporate malfeasance was widespread among major 
US corporations as WorldCom, Tyco, and Martha Stewart, to name a few, were soon under investigation by 
the SEC and the Department of Justice. 
In 2002 this corporate accounting scandal, precipitated by 
the collapse of Enron, resulted in the passage of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) by the US government. The intent 
of SOX was to institute accuracy, reliability and transparency 
in corporate accounting practices, thus making it easier for 
investors and shareholders to determine a company’s 
finances. In essence, SOX was intended to restore both 
shareholder and global confidence in American financial 
markets. 
The Act was implemented in stages, beginning in July 2004. 
The results of its passage and implementation are still 
playing out in today’s media and courts. Hardly a day passes 
without news of a publicly traded company either being 
issued a subpoena by or settling charges with the SEC.  
Praised and criticized by business and Congress alike, can 
SOX, in the fast–changing global financial world, succeed in 
reforming corporate accounting practices and restoring 
integrity to American financial markets? Is it too soon to tell? 
Corporate Accounting and SOX 
In a 2004 article, David Henry, a senior writer for the finance section of Business Week, coined the phrase 
“fuzzy numbers” to describe the great amount of flexibility built into corporate accounting practices. He found 
that company management could legally manipulate earnings data to their advantage by using existing 
accounting rules for estimating sales, predicting bad debts, and forecasting unusual gains or losses. 
 Companies had found additional ways to pump up their short–term cash flows with such strategies as 
counting money lent to customers as sales, selling accounts receivables, and shrinking working capital. Finally, 
corporations made their financial statements extremely complex and difficult to understand by employing 
secret accounts, reporting financial transactions on differing timelines, and using copious footnotes. 
To combat these practices, SOX set up five major goals: 
• to restore confidence in the accounting profession by creating the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) funded by fees to public companies,  
• to foster an ethical corporate culture and reduce conflicts of interest for corporate directors and 
auditors, 
• to improve corporate disclosure and financial reporting, 
• to improve the performance of other professionals (e.g. auditors and corporate attorneys) who are in 
the position to protect investors, and 
• to provide enhanced enforcement tools for the SEC, including the ability to establish “Fair Funds” 
through which civil penalties can be returned to the investors (Glassman 2007). 
In order to achieve these goals, SOX set forth many requirements; these are the most important:  
• that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) accept responsibility for and 
attest to the veracity of the data supplied (PL 107–204, Title III, Sec. 302) , 
• that the CEO and CFO be responsible for internal accounting controls and for reporting on the 
effectiveness of these controls (PL 107–204, Title IV, Sec. 302),  
• that external auditors verify the accuracy of the CEO and CFO statements (PL 107–204, Title IV, Sec. 
404), and that the auditors report to the company’s directors (PL 107–204, Title II, Sec. 204),  
• that the directors be from outside the company (PL 107–204, Title III, Sec. 301), 
• that there be immediate disclosure of material changes in a company’s finances or operations (PL 107–
204, Title IV, Sec.409), and  
• that CEOs and CFOs face criminal liability, with fines up to one million dollars and imprisonment up to 
ten years for even mistakenly filing inaccurate reports. (PL 107–204, Title IX, Sec. 906) 
Responses to SOX 
Many companies initially balked at creating an internal accounting framework to generate financial reports, 
saying it was unnecessary and too expensive; however Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC, stated in a 
December 2005 interview, “With just a few years of Sarbanes–Oxley under their belts, most companies are 
begrudgingly admitting that the exercise has produced benefits.” Companies reported improved business 
processes in such areas as risk management, accuracy of financial information, and internal and external data 
integration (Labaton 2006). 
Despite increased benefits to companies and shareholders, an industry–wide consensus emerged that 
compliance implementation costs were unduly burdensome for corporations. In 2004 costs for compliance 
certification work by outside auditors plus increased director and officer insurance premiums ranged from 
over $8.5 million for large companies to $1.2 million for mid–size companies (Cone 2006). In response to the 
increased work required of them, directors raised their fees for attending board meetings. Researchers found 
that the impact of increased auditing and director fees was proportionally greater for smaller companies 
(Linck, Netter and Yang 2007). 
In response to these disproportionate cost burdens, the SEC extended the SOX compliance deadline for 
foreign and small companies from November 15, 2004, to July 15, 2007.  The deadline for outside auditors to 
verify the company’s reports was delayed to December 15, 2008 (Tucci 2006).  
The approaching 2004 deadline triggered a second response to the Act: the filing of an increased number of 
corporate restatements. These restatements correct or complete already filed financial reports presumably 
found wanting in the face of SOX requirements. In all, 650 restatements were recorded in 2004 and 1,295 
restatements in 2005. Most were due mainly to issues with expense classification, misclassified cash–flow 
items, and equity issues. Fourteen percent, or 181, were “stealth” restatements, that is, amended statements 
filed with the SEC without proper or sometimes any notice to the shareholders (Taub, Restatements 2006). 
Research published in July of 2006 revealed that executives were being given the right to purchase stocks at 
prices timed to stock price low point, second most low point, or just prior to release of positive financial 
statements (Heron and Lie 2006). This practice gave executives the right to purchase stock at heavily 
discounted prices which they could then sell for large personal profit. The exposure of this questionable 
practice led to financial restatements reaching a record 1,876 by the end of 2006. Of these, 254 were stealth 
restatements (Taub, Study 2007). 
Further probable reasons for the high number of corporate restatements include the new criminal penalties 
that can be imposed under SOX coupled with a higher risk of detection for CEOs and CFOs. The SEC 
encouraged guilty companies to pay fines, make shareholder restitution and file restated financial reports by 
promising not to pursue criminal charges against them. This allowed companies and auditors to reduce their 
liability and exposure to shareholder suits. Since most settlements are covered by insurance and therefore not 
a company liability, companies have an additional, economic incentive to settle and restate. 
A third corporate response to SOX was a significant increase in the number of public companies delisting from 
the major stock exchanges and citing as reason the high costs of SOX compliance. Within two years of SOX 
implementation, 370 publicly traded companies delisted from a major exchange and went to over–the–
counter (OTC) trading, which exempted them from SOX compliance. The majority of the companies delisting 
were smaller companies with poor recent stock market performance and higher debt or with lower growth 
opportunities and capital market interest.  After 2006 the number of companies delisting returned to pre–SOX 
levels. (There was not a significant change in the number of companies going private.) 
Researchers concluded that although the higher costs of SOX were cited, poor accounting quality, agency 
problems (such as not having independent directors) and lack of investor interest were the actual reasons for 
public companies to delist (Leuz, Triantis and Wang 2006). Corporate decisions to delist may have also been 
influenced by other market forces such as lower returns, lower stock prices and new listing requirements for 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
(NASDAQ). In fact, some of the requirements for company directors adopted by the boards of these exchanges 
were more stringent than those imposed by SOX (Final 2003). 
A fourth response to SOX was two notable legal cases. The first was a challenge by the US Chamber of 
Commerce to the rule–making authority of the SEC. In 2004 the SEC passed a rule requiring mutual funds’ 
board chairmen to be independent of the fund’s investment adviser and for seventy–five percent of the 
board’s directors also to be independent. On April 7, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia vacated the rule, stating the SEC had failed to consider sufficiently the costs imposed on the 
mutual funds by the rule (Wallison 2007). 
The second case was a Constitutional legal challenge filed on February 7, 2006, by the Free Enterprise Fund 
(FEF) in the US District Court of Washington. The FEF alleged the structure of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCOAB), set up by SOX, violates the principle of the separation of powers established by 
Article II Section 2 of the US Constitution. The FEF argued that although PCAOB members perform an 
executive function, they are not appointed or removed by the President; and Congress cannot control the 
Board’s budget (Schmidt 2006). On March 21, 2007, the US Supreme Court found in favor of the PCAOB. 
An increase of initial public offerings (IPOs) on foreign exchanges coupled with a decrease in IPOs on American 
exchanges by both foreign and American private companies choosing to become public  was perceived by 
some as a fifth response to SOX.  Allen Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, in a surprise 
reversal from his initial support of SOX, stated that SOX “discouraged risk–taking and was driving foreign 
companies to shun the New York Stock Exchange for the lighter rules in London” (Bianco 2006). Other 
prominent economists, however, attributed the trend of private companies choosing to go public on foreign 
exchanges to globalization. They proposed that foreign stock markets have greatly improved and become 
highly competitive with the established US markets (Lawder 2007). To combat lost revenue from this trend, 
both the NYSE and the NASDAQ exchanges engaged in expanding their control to European markets. 
Research also explained the smaller percentage of total IPOs on American exchanges as resulting from 
changes in company characteristics rather than from negative influences by regulations such as SOX. 
Researchers found that most companies recently completing IPOs on foreign exchanges were small and did 
not meet the requirements for such offerings on the US exchanges. The researchers concluded that the 
increased capital–raising activity and governance benefits associated with listing on US markets were unique 
and not significantly harmed by SOX (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007).  In addition, from 2003 through mid–
2007, the US capital markets were flooded with private money, thereby eliminating the need for companies to 
tap the public markets for capital. 
Enforcement of SOX 
Despite criticism, legal challenges and corporate attempts to thwart SOX compliance, the SEC has enforced the 
implementation of SOX. The year 2004 marked the height of criminal indictments of corporations and 
corporate management; however, the mix of all cases brought by the SEC has remained constant over the 
years. Financial disclosure cases represent thirty–five percent of total cases, insider trading represents twenty 
percent, market manipulation and market fraud each represent twelve percent, and the remaining twenty–
one percent of cases is split between issues with brokers, advisors and investment companies (Bruch 2007). 
Since implementation, the SEC has authorized the disgorgement of penalties totaling $5.15 billion, of which 
$4.33 billion was collected and placed in Fair Funds accounts for return to shareholders (Glassman 2007). 
The SEC has exercised some latitude in enforcing SOX, especially since the successful 2006 challenge by the US 
Chamber of Commerce. Recognizing the disproportionate implementation costs, the SEC extended the SOX 
compliance deadline for small and foreign companies. Separately, in 2006 the SEC issued to its enforcement 
officers a series of factors to consider in determining whether to issue a penalty against a company. Three 
primary factors were whether the shareholders benefited from the misconduct, whether the current 
shareholders would be further victimized by a penalty and the pervasiveness of the misconduct within the 
company (Casey 2007). 
Recently, the SEC has done several things to further reduce compliance costs. Among these was changing 
companies’ internal controls audit process to a less costly method than previously required (Casey 2007). The 
PCAOB followed suit with amended rules that directed companies and auditors to focus only on matters that 
have a. significant impact on business operations, reputation, profitability, net assets, and other investor 
interests (Wallison 2007). While not exempting foreign companies listing on US exchanges from SOX 
compliance, to lower their listing costs the SEC lifted the rule requiring foreign companies to reconcile their 
financial statements with US accounting standards. 
To allay concerns that the SEC might not vigorously enforce SOX provisions, Congress has maintained oversight 
of the SEC’s enforcement of SOX. On June 26, 2007, the commissioners of the SEC were called to testify before 
Congress. One concern was the new monetary penalty policy established by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, 
which required SEC enforcement attorneys to get approval from the SEC commissioners to enter into 
negotiations with companies over fines and other penalties. A second concern was the perceived conflict of 
interest by a senior SEC attorney in a pending shareholder lawsuit before the US Supreme Court (Gordon and 
Yost 2007). 
Can SOX Do it? 
Whether or not SOX will succeed in reforming corporate accounting practices and restoring integrity to 
American financial markets cannot yet be definitively answered. Certainly the number of restatements point 
to the uncovering of accounting problems, which has led to improved reporting.  Although some marginally 
performing companies chose to delist rather than comply with SOX, most corporate leaders reported benefits 
resulting from compliance. To facilitate this compliance, the SEC has changed deadlines and accounting rules. 
The SEC also implemented a policy change designed to reduce management’s burden for internal controls. 
Despite many studies, there is still insufficient data that distinguishes the effects of SOX from that of other 
market forces. Around the same time that SOX was enacted, both the NYSE and NASDAQ changed their listing 
requirements.  Before SOX was fully implemented, increased competition from foreign financial markets 
motivated US exchanges to expand into markets beyond SOX jurisdiction. 
Suffice to say, investors cried out for relief from the criminal excesses of corporate leadership exposed by the 
Enron scandal, and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was created. Despite ongoing attempts by Wall Street insiders to 
overturn the Act, compliance with SOX is ongoing. Improvements in business processes, risk management and 
accuracy of financial information have certainly resulted. Of most value to investors and the American people, 
however, is the damper the Act has put on corporate criminal conduct because of increased risks of detection 
and penalties. Perhaps credibility will one day return to US financial markets. 
I am grateful to John R. Tommasi for his course “Economics of Business Activities” and the assignment to report 
on David Henry’s October 4, 2004, article “Fuzzy Numbers.”  
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